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RECENT DECISIONS
a policy-making official, such as petitioner, should enjoy the privilege.
The Court summed up its reasoning by saying that "the concept of
duty encompasses the sound exercise of discretionary authority." 41
Mr. Justice Black concurred, on the ground that petitioner acted
within the scope of his authority. Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on
the basis that the press release was beyond the perimeter of peti-
tioner's authority.
Perhaps the dissenting opinion of Justices Warren and Douglas
and also that of Mr. Justice Brennan present a sounder appraisal of
the problem. It has been submitted that the proposed test embodied
within the Court's opinion may require in each case an evaluation of
the position of the officer and the duties of his office, 42 placing a pos-
sible burden on the plaintiff to negate the raising of the defense of
absolute privilege.43 It would seem a better policy to grant these
officials a qualified privilege for statements to the public, limiting
absolute privilege to those officers appointed by the President or di-
rectly responsible to him. The case for qualified privilege is strong.
To overcome a qualified or conditional privilege a plaintiff must
prove that the communication was defamatory, untrue and activated
by actual malice.4 4 Nevertheless, this would construct a strong pro-
tective wall about our government personnel in the course of their
official duties, without unnecessarily encroaching upon the rights of
the individual citizen.
M
TRUSTS - POWER TO DISTRIBUTE FROM CORPUS DOES NOT
ENTAIL POWER TO TERMINATE TRUST.-Plaintiff-trustees sought a
judgment authorizing the termination of a trust by the payment of
the principal in a lump sum to the beneficiary in order to avoid ex-
cessive tax rates. The agreement authorized the trustees to pay from
time to time to the life beneficiary so much of the principal as the
appropriate exercise of the discretion with which an executive officer of peti-
tioner's rank is necessarily clothed to publish the press release here at issue in
the circumstances disclosed by this record." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
41 Id. at 575.
42 "As the Government acknowledged on oral argument, Congress, when it
creates executive agencies, almost never expressly authorizes the new agency
to issue press releases as part of its functions. Nor does it decree which em-
ployees of the new agency will have such duties and which will not. By
necessity, therefore, the decision will require a de novo appraisal of almost
every charge of defamation by a government official." Id. at 578-79 (dissenting
opinion).
43 Id. at 579.
44 Id. at 586.
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trustees might in their discretion deem for her best interests. Despite
the broad scope of discretionary power granted by the deed, the Court
held that it was not within the intention of the settlor to empower the
trustees to terminate the trust with one payment to the beneficiary
and thus defeat the interests of the remaindermen. Kemp v. Paterson,
6 N.Y.2d 40, 159 N.E.2d 661, 188 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1959).
Where a trustee hag a discretionary power, the court cannot
interfere with the exercise of that power except to prevent an abuse
of discretion.- However, once the court assumes jurisdiction of the
trust, there is a divergence of views as to the proper extent of control
to be exercised by the court.2  The rule in Maryland, as provided
by statute, is that any party interested in the trust may have the
entire trust estate or such part thereof as the court may deem proper
administered under the supervision of a court of equity.3 However,
the New York view is that the court cannot substitute its discretion
for that of the trustees so as to deprive them of the honest exercise
of the discretionary power vested in them. 4
As a general rule, a trust is terminated when its purpose has
been fulfilled. 5 However, the settlor may, expressly 6 or impliedly,
authorize the trustees to terminate the trust when, in their discretion,
they deem it proper. Once it is determined that the trustee has in
his discretion the authority to terminate the trust, the court will only
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 187 (1959); 3 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS, Reporters' Notes § 187 (1959); LEWIN, TRUSTS 332
(15th ed. 1950) ; 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 187 (1939).
2 See the cases cited in 2 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 988 n.1.
3 MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 193 (1957). Earlier cases construed this rule
so as to authorize the court to substitute its discretion for that of the trustees
whenever it assumed jurisdiction. Abell v. Abell, 75 Md. 44, 23 Atl. 71 (1891).
See 2 PERRY, TRUSTS § 474 (7th ed. 1929). This construction has been limited
so that today only when an application is made under this section must the
trustee submit to the supervision of the court for all of his further adminis-
trative acts. Offutt v. Offutt, 204 Md. 101, 102 A.2d 554, 557 (1954). This
rule seems not to be generally followed.
-1 In re Hilton, 174 App. Div. 193, 160 N.Y. Supp. 55 (1st Dep't 1916);
In re Shiel's Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Surr. Ct. 1953); Matter of Emmons,
165 Misc. 192, 300 N.Y. Supp. 580 (Surr. Ct. 1937). This view is more com-
monly followed. See 2 Scor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 988. See, e.g., Yeates v.
Box, 198 Miss. 602, 22 So. 2d 411 (1945) (dictum); Viall v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Co., 45 R.I. 432, 123 Atl. 570 (1924) (dictum). In both of these
cases the court did interfere because it found the trustees had acted dishonestly.
5 Seeberg v. Norville, 204 Ala. 20, 85 So. 505, 507 (1920); Yeates v.
Box, supra note 4, at -, 22 So. 2d at 415; Angell v. Angell, 28 R.I. 592,
68 Atl. 583 (1908).
6 Hotchkiss v. McWhorter, 158 Ga. 259, 123 S.E. 265 (1924) ; Cary v.
Shad, 220 Ill. 508, 77 N.E. 234 (1906).
See, e.g., In re Osborn, 252 App. Div. 438, 299 N.Y. Supp. 593 (2d Dep't
1937); In re Rosenberg's Will, 121 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Surr. Ct. 1953); In re
Abert's Estate, 118 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Surr. Ct. 1950). Where the authority is
implied, the settlor's intent must be construed in light of all surrounding facts
and circumstances. In re Golodetz's Will, 118 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
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interfere with the exercise of that discretionary power where it is
motivated "from caprice, careless good nature or the desire to obtain
relief from further fiduciary duties." 8 Where the settlor has sub-
jected the remaindermen's interest to an invasion of principal for the
life beneficiary, the remaindermen only have the right to whatever is
left after the death of the life beneficiary.9 The rights of remainder-
men are subordinate to the primary purpose of the trust as indicated
by the settlor's intent.10
There has been. a tendency to use the best interests of the bene-
ficiary as a standard to control the discretionary powers of a trustee."
The term "best interests" is a broad, flexible standard which embraces
such objects and purposes as in the trustee's judgment would be bene-
ficial to the cestui que trust.'2 However, the standard of best interests
is not without limitation.'3  In the first place, the trustee is bound to
act within the framework of the purposes of the trust. 14  He is also
obliged to meet the test of reasonableness.' 5 Where, by the terms of
the trust, the trustee is directed to pay as much of the principal as
he believes would be for the beneficiary's best interests, he would be
guilty of an abuse of discretion if it clearly appears that he is paying
the beneficiary less than any reasonable man would in a like situation.,'
8 1n, re Rosenberg's Will, supra note 7, at 877. See also Roosevelt v.
Roosevelt, 6 Hun 31 (Sup. Ct. 1875), aff'd mem., 64 N.Y. 651 (1876); Ports-
mouth v. Shackford, 46 N.H. 423, 426 (1866). However, the court is quick to
admonish the trustee where he has acted from fraudulent, selfish or other im-
proper motives. See In re Wilkin, 183 N.Y. 104, 75 N.E. 1105 (1905) ; Wallace
v. Julier, 147 Fla. 420, 3 So. 2d 711 (1941); In re Buchar's Estate, 225 Pa.
427, 74 Atl. 237 (1909). See also 2 PmmnY, TRUSTS § 511 (7th ed. 1929).
0 See Matter of Osborn, 252 App. Div. 438, 445, 299 N.Y. Supp. 593,
600-02 (2d Dep't 1939) (dictum).
10 Longwith v. Riggs, 123 Ill. 258, 14 N.E. 840 (1887) ; Petition of Wolcott,
95 N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948).
"1 See McLucas, Discretionary Trusts, 37 TRUST Bui. 17, 71-72 (1958).
12 See generally, Bowditch v. Attorney General, 241 Mass. 168, 175, 134 N.E.
796, 800 (1922). The term "best interests" includes the authority to do what-
ever adds to the beneficiary's welfare and advancement.
13 Fleming, "Best Interests" As A Standard For Trustee Action, 46 ILL.
BAR J. 765 (1958).
14 Matter of Ahrens, 193 Misc. 844, 84 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Surr. Ct 1948), aff'd
inem., 301 N.Y. 701, 95 N.E.2d 53 (1950). The purpose of the trust is deter-
mined not only by construing the trust instrument itself but also by considering
the factual situation surrounding the creation of the trust in light of the tes-
tator's intent. See In re Golodetz's Will, 118 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Surr. Ct. 1952) ;
Yeates v. Box, 198 Miss. 602, 22 So. 2d 411 (1945); McLucas, The Discre-
tionary Trust, 92 TRUSTS & ESTATES 824 (Nov. 1953).
'5 Peach v. First Nat'l Bank, 247 Ala. 463, 25 So. 2d 153 (1946) ; Ducan
v. Elkins, 94 N.H. 13, 45 A.2d 297 (1946); Viall v. Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co., 45 R.I. 432, 123 Atl. 570 (1924).
16 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 187.2 (1939).
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The discretion of the trustee must also be exercised in good faith 17
and with proper motives.' s
In the instant case, the Appellate Division determined that though
the purposes for which the trustees sought to terminate the trust
would "in a sense . . . serve the beneficiary's 'best interests,' " that
term should not be interpreted in its broadest meaning, but should
be limited, so as not to extend beyond the scope of the trust deed.19
The Court of Appeals affirmed stating that though it is within the
discretionary power of a trustee to pay out all of the corpus of the
trust for the beneficiary's best interests in a proper case, this was not
such a case since it would be inconsistent with the intent of the
settlor. 20  The dissent, however, clearly points out that the purpose
of any settlor in establishing a trust is to secure the benefits which
inure from its very nature, that is, flexibility and the good judgment
of a dependable trustee. Therefore, it could not be the intent of
this settlor to deny to the trustees the power to terminate when
admittedly 21 it would be for the best interests of the beneficiary.
Here the trustee sought to provide for the best interests of the bene-
ficiary by terminating the trust. This would provide better support
and education for her children and avoid oppressive tax rates. Under
existing tax statutes, the trust income was subject to a tax of 922
per cent which entitled the tax collector to $32,375 and the benefi-
ciary to $2,625. If the beneficiary died, the corpus would be subject
to a British estate tax of 65 per cent, leaving a remainder interest
of $245,000 out of an estate of $700,000.22
The majority view strictly construes the intent of the settlor as
limiting the trustees' authority to exhaust the trust by one payment
which in their judgment is for the best interests of the beneficiary.
This seems to break away from a tendency to liberally construe the
settlor's intent to confer broad discretionary powers on a trustee. 23
For example, in 1950 the Surrogate Court of New York County
17 Lenzner v. Falk, 68 N.Y.S.2d 699, 703 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Richmond
v. Stamm, 339 Ill. App. 274, 89 N.E.2d 745 (1949) ; In re Filzen's Estate, 252
Wise. 322, 31 N.W.2d 520 (1948).
"' Funk v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1950); Woodard v.
Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 67 S.E.2d 639 (1951).
19 Kemp v. Paterson, 4 App. Div. 2d 153, 156, 163 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248 (1st
Dep't 1957).
20 Kemp v. Paterson, 6 N.Y.2d 40, 43, 159 N.E.2d 661, 662, 188 N.Y.S.2d
163 (1959).
21 Although the Court of Appeals did not expressly admit that it was in
the child's best interests, it adopted the opinion of the Appellate Division which
did expressly hold that it was in her best interests.
22 Kemp v. Paterson, supra note 20, at 45, 159 N.E.2d at 663, 188 N.Y.S.2d
at 164.
23 re Wilkin, 183 N.Y. 104, 75 N.E. 1105 (1905): In re Rosenberg's
Will, 121 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Surr. Ct. 1953) ; In re Abert's Estate, 118 N.Y.S.2d
864 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
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held that authorizing the trustee to make payments "from time to
time" did not prohibit the trustee from turning the entire principal
over to the beneficiary in one payment.24 In 1953, the Surrogate
Court of Bronx County permitted the trustee to terminate a trust
with one payment when he deemed it necessary to carry out the
purposes of the trust.
25
In the instant case it is clear that the settlor's intent in estab-
lishing the trust was to secure flexibility in the management of her
estate so that the "best interests" of the beneficiary would be fur-
thered in accordance with changing conditions. To carry out this
intent, the settlor authorized the trustees in their discretion to manage
the estate in the best interests of the beneficiary. For the Court to
deny the trustees' authority to terminate the trust would seem to
usurp the discretionary power granted to the trustees.
24 It re Abert's Estate, note 23 supra.
2' In re Rosenberg's Will, note 23 supra.
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